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MEDICAL FUTILITY & MARYLAND LAW

O

n November 30, 2010, over 200
individuals attended the Maryland Health Care Ethics Committee Network's (MHECN’s) symposium on
medical futility and Maryland law at the
University of Maryland, Baltimore campus. Medical futility typically refers to a
type of conflict over end-of-life medical
treatment, usually the type of treatment
provided in a hospital’s intensive care
unit. In these disputes, the patient almost
never has capacity (sometimes referred
to as competence) to understand and
make treatment decisions. So, health care
decisions are made by the patient’s substitute decision makers: whether patientappointed, court-appointed, or default.
The paradigmatic medical futility dispute
is one in which the surrogate requests
aggressive treatment interventions for
an imminently dying or catastrophically
chronically ill patient. However, that
patient’s providers consider such treatment to be medically ineffective (i.e.,
unable to achieve the desired goal) and/
or ethically inappropriate. For example,
patients over age 85 undergoing in-hospital cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
have only a 6% chance of surviving to
hospital discharge. Those with pre-existing co-morbidities are even less likely
to survive. And many of the very few
that do survive have significantly poorer
neurological and functional states than
they did before cardiac arrest. In short,
physicians are reluctant to pound on a
patient’s chest, break ribs, and otherwise
cause suffering and burdens, when there
is no corresponding benefit to be gained.

When death is unavoidable and continued life-sustaining interventions can only
make death more uncomfortable, providers frequently determine that palliative
care (which focuses on the relief of pain,
symptoms and stress of serious illness) is
most appropriate.
Fortunately, the vast majority of
medical futility disputes are resolved
through good communication. When the
treatment team meets with the patient’s
family (often on several occasions)
and carefully explains the prognosis,
they almost always reach consensus.
Toward this end, palliative care teams
have made progress at some hospitals.
Still, in a small but significant subset of
cases, conflict remains intractable. The
conference focused primarily upon these
intractable cases and whether Maryland’s
Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA) is
effective in providing ethical resolution.
The HCDA provides that life-sustaining
medical treatment (such as dialysis, a
ventilator, artificial nutrition and hydration) may be withheld or withdrawn
from incapacitated patients only with the
consent of an authorized decision maker,
except in two circumstances: (1) where
treatment is “medically ineffective” and/
or (2) where treatment is “ethically inappropriate.” But the statute defines these
terms in such a narrow way that these
exceptions do not apply to most futility disputes. Furthermore, even when
these exceptions do apply, the statute still
requires providers to continue complying
with treatment decisions unless or until
Cont. on page 2
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the patient is transferred to another
provider or facility. Since such transfer sites are almost never found, the
statute effectively requires providers
to comply with surrogate requests for
aggressive curative treatment that they
consider non-beneficial, burdensome,
and even cruel.
A survey conducted by MHECN
in 2010 by hospital attorneys, risk
managers, and ICU physicians revealed that physicians comply with
surrogate requests for medically ineffective treatment for dying patients
due, in part, to fear of being sued.
Furthermore, there are varying interpretations of the HCDA that create
inconsistencies in end-of-life decisionmaking from one patient and health
care provider to the next. In short, the
“medically ineffective” and “ethically inappropriate” provisions in the
HCDA—either due to the way the law
is written or how it is interpreted and
applied—do not provide an adequate
mechanism for resolving intractable

medical futility disputes.
Speakers at the November 30 symposium described alternatives to Maryland’s HCDA. Charlie Sabatino, J.D.,
Director of the American Bar Association’s Commission on Law and Aging,
reviewed state laws related to medical
futility. One example is Texas’s law,
which allows physicians to withhold or
withdraw treatment considered “ethically inappropriate” after a period of
ten days, providing that certain due
process standards are met.
Lawrence Schneiderman, M.D.,
Professor Emeritus in the Department
of Family and Preventive Medicine
and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Medicine at the University
of California, San Diego, described
the approach taken by a consortium
of California hospitals. They sought a
community standard of medical futility
among local hospitals. University of
California San Diego (UCSD) Medical
Center adopted the resulting majority

The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a
membership organization, established by the Law and Health Care Program
at the University of Maryland School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is
to facilitate and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making
in health care settings by supporting and providing informational and
educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in
the state of Maryland. The Network works to achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate
ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to assist
their institution to act consistently with its mission statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network
members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other
healthcare providers, and members of the general public on ethical
issues in health care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees
and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
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REPLACE THE SURROGATE?
A separate Maryland Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA) provision may be of some use in intractable futility
disputes between a surrogate and health care providers. When a surrogate makes a treatment decision that clearly
contradicts what the patient would have wanted, the provider need not comply with that decision. The HCDA
provides: “Any person authorized to make health care decisions for another under this section shall base those
decisions on the wishes of the patient and, if the wishes of the patient are unknown or unclear, on the patient's best
interest.” In other words, surrogates must make decisions that reflect the patient’s values, preferences, or best interests. Otherwise, they act outside the scope of their authority. Surrogates who are not faithful agents can and should
be replaced. While effective and functional in some cases, surrogate replacement is hardly a complete solution to
medical futility disputes. Most patients have not completed any advance care planning. Of the 34% of Marylanders who have completed advance directives, those directives are usually unavailable when needed. And even when
available, those directives usually fail to speak to the patient’s current clinical circumstances. In short, there is often
no evidence of patient preferences. Consequently, it is impossible to demonstrate any contradiction between those
preferences and surrogate decisions. While we know, statistically, that few of us would want to live in an extremely
compromised condition, particularly if cognitively unaware, providers often do not know what any particular patient is willing to live with. In such cases, there are rarely grounds to replace a surrogate requesting treatment that
providers determine is inappropriate.
Thaddeus Mason Pope, JD

community standard, which defines
medical futility in their institutional
policy as: “Any treatment without a
realistic chance of providing an effect
that the patient would ever have the
capacity to appreciate as a benefit,
such as merely preserving the physiologic functions of a permanently
unconsciousness patient, or has no
realistic chance of achieving the medical goal of returning the patient to a
level of health that permits survival
outside the acute care setting of UCSD
Medical Center.” UCSD also offers
a process for compassionate dispute
resolution and effective comfort care.
This policy defines the professional
standard of practice at UCSD Medical
Center and serves to inform the public
and as a guideline for the courts. A
hospital could also adopt a minority
standard in which it defines futility

differently and/or chooses not to limit
life-sustaining treatment. Accordingly,
it should declare this as its professional standard of practice, formalize it as
policy to inform the public as well as
a guideline for the courts. Importantly,
such a hospital should also accept
transferred patients desiring treatments
considered medically futile at other
hospitals.
In the afternoon sessions at the
November 30th symposium, attendees
shared their ideas and suggestions for
how to improve conflict resolution
related to medical futility disputes.
Most participants seemed to agree
that revisions to the Maryland HCDA
are in order. Providers need to be able
to “stand up” for their patients. The
tough work is designing a dispute
resolution mechanism that can act with
the real-time speed these cases de-

mand, yet include sufficient safeguards
to ensure due process protections like
neutral and unbiased adjudication.
“Next steps” based on round table discussions from the November 30 symposium are currently being explored
by University of Maryland School of
Law professors Diane Hoffmann, J.D.,
M.S. and Jack Schwartz, J.D., and
Maryland Assistant Attorney General
Paul Ballard, J.D.
Thaddeus Mason Pope, JD
Law Professor
Widener University
Wilmington, Delaware
www.thaddeuspope.com
A version of this article was reprinted
with permission from the United
Seniors of Maryland Newsletter,
January, 2011.

Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 3

I

THE PHILOSOPHER'S CORNER: DETERMINING DEATH

n the early twentieth century,
defining death as the cessation
or absence of life was
straightforward. A person was dead
when his heart stopped beating
and air no longer flowed through
his lungs. A clinical test of death
involved either listening for a
heartbeat or placing a mirror in front
of a patient’s mouth to see if fog
appeared. Although these clinical
techniques were imperfect, and
occasionally resulted in premature
burial, there was general agreement
that death was determined by the
permanent and irreversible cessation
of cardiopulmonary function.
Beginning in the 1960s, however,
advances in life-sustaining
technologies made it possible not
only to resuscitate people whose
respiration and heartbeat had ceased,
but also to artificially maintain
their cardiopulmonary function in
the absence of brain function. In
recognition of that possibility, the
Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical School recommended in
1968 that patients on life support,
who had sustained irreversible and
complete brain damage, be declared
dead (Ad Hoc Comm. of Harvard
Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, 1968).
There were two practical implications
of this recommendation. First,
it allowed for the withdrawal of
expensive life support from patients
the Committee believed would
no longer benefit; and second, it
facilitated organ transplantation by
increasing the supply of organs from
the newly dead (Shaw & Miller,
2010).
In the aftermath of the Harvard
Committee’s report, the “whole
brain” definition of death gained
important legal grounding. The
President’s Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine
4 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research accepted the whole brain
criteria in 1981, arguing (in the face
of some controversy) that because
the brain is the command center
for the whole organism, when it
dies, so too does the organism (The
President’s Commission, 1981). That
same year, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws incorporated the whole brain
definition of death into the Uniform
Determination of Death Act (UDDA),
which defined death as either
“irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions” or
“irreversible cessation of all functions
of the entire brain, including the
brain stem” (Uniform Determination
of Death Act, 2008). Today, all
fifty states legally recognize both
cardio-pulmonary and whole-brain
definitions of death.*
Despite what appears to be
nationwide agreement on the legal
standards for determining death, some
scholars are now expressing concern
that, in practice, cardiopulmonary
and whole-brain criteria are simply
legal fictions to increase the number
of available organs for transplantation
(Shaw & Miller, 2010). In the
context of cardiopulmonary criteria
for death, critics argue that the
working definition has changed
over time from one based on the
impossibility of resuscitation, to
one based on the decision not to
resuscitate.
In the 1990s, several hospitals
began practicing controlled
organ donation after circulatory
determination of death (DCDD).
These protocols, which continue
today, involve removing lifesustaining treatment based on a
patient or his proxy’s wishes, and
then waiting a set amount of time
for the heart to stop beating before
procuring organs. Critics argue that
in these circumstances, death is

based on an affirmative decision not
to resuscitate the individual, rather
than the impossibility of cardiac
resuscitation or the irreversibility
of cardiopulmonary function.
According to some scholars, DCDD
protocols fudge the cardiopulmonary
definition of death by declaring the
imminently dying patient’s organs
available for transplant before the
patient is actually dead (Evans, 2007).
Many scholars also have criticized
whole brain death criteria on the
ground that it, too, is misconceived
and open to manipulation. These
critics challenge the claim that total
brain death signals the loss of an
organism’s integrative functioning.
Relying on scientific advances, they
proffer evidence that important
biological functions, including
gestation and some brain functions,
can continue in patients considered
dead under whole brain criteria
(Halevy, 2001; Shewmon, 2001;
Shewmon, 2009). In response to this
evidence, the President’s Council
on Bioethics issued a white paper
in 2008 that acknowledged the
shortcomings of whole brain death
criteria and the need to reassess it
(The President’s Council, 2008). In
the meantime, critics argue, “the
declaration of death for most patients
diagnosed as dead on the basis of
neurological criteria is inconsistent
with the UDDA, which requires
irreversible cessation of all function
of the entire brain (Shaw & Miller,
2010, p. 552).”
If the critics are correct that our
modern definitions of death are
legal fictions to accommodate organ
transplantation, then the time has
come for all of us to consider whether
these are legal fictions we can live
with (like the notion that corporations
are persons), or whether our story
needs revisions.

Leslie Meltzer Henry, JD
Assistant Professor
University of Maryland
School of Law
Jennifer Pike
Student
University of Maryland
School of Law
* Two states, New Jersey and New
York, permit patients to object to
neurological declarations of death
based on the patient’s religious views.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A (2010).
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CASE PRESENTATION
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation of a case considered
by an ethics committee and an analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are both
encouraged to comment on the case or analysis and to submit other cases that their
ethics committee has dealt with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and
others in the case should only be provided with the permission of the patient. Unless
otherwise indicated, our policy is not to identify the submitter or institution. We may
also change facts to protect confidentiality. Cases and comments should be sent to
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & Health Care Program, University
of Maryland School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.

CASE STUDY FROM A
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

A

17 year old female is admitted
to the medical ward of a community hospital for malnutrition and weight loss due to anorexia
nervosa. A nurse on the floor contacts
the ethics committee to inquire about
the ethical standard of care for such
patients. The nurse was told by the
patient's physician and nursing supervisor to interact minimally with the
patient to avoid being "manipulated"
by her, and to use restraints as necessary to ensure that the patient receives
the ordered tube feedings via nasogastric tube. The nurse who requested the
ethics consultation believes that it is
the nurse's duty to attempt to establish
a therapeutic bond with her patient
whenever possible, and that actively
force feeding the patient—including
with the use of hand restraints—will
thwart trust-building and may do
more harm than good.

COMMENTS FROM
A NURSE CASE MANAGER
My experience as a registered nurse
leaves me with many questions of
process after reading of the anorexic,
manipulative patient whose nurse
was ordered to restrain and force
feed her. The first thought that comes
to mind when reading the scenario
is the lack of empathy that is being
directed and instituted towards this

particular patient. It is imperative that
empathy and compassion be at the
forefront when deciding matters of
importance and impact for others. The
manner in which we approach decision
making is crucial in forming a trusting
caregiver patient relationship as well
as developing the patients’ confidence
in medical science. The interpersonal
relationships that we build in return
create a therapeutic milieu to enhance
and nurture the healing process. In
cases where medical professionals
are making decisions for those whose
judgments may be impaired, empathy
for and understanding of the condition
being treated must be applied.
Throughout the healthcare spectrum
all decisions should be weighed
carefully with this premise close to
mind, in order to professionally and
ethically provide the optimal care that
is warranted and deserved by those
entrusted to our services.
A seventeen year-old female
diagnosed with anorexia nervosa being
treated in a community hospital would
most likely be an inappropriate setting
to institute the extreme measures the
doctor and nurse manager are calling
for. A community hospital, in most
circumstances, would not provide the
expertise needed to adequately address
the patient’s medical, emotional, as
well as psychological needs. The
needs of this young woman would be
better served at a specialty hospital
or facility with physicians and nurses
Cont. on page 6
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who are trained and experienced with
the array of complicated medical as
well as psychological aspects of this
devastating disease. A full history of
the patient, previous treatment with
regard to successes and failures along
with the course of progression the
disease has taken is needed to best
treat the underlying causes of anorexia
nervosa. There are many similar
aspects to a population suffering from
anorexia, but each individual’s disease
has an identity and trigger of its own.
Isolation of a patient does not help us
gain insight on what the root causes
may be.
The patient at this time is not
legally able to make her own medical
decisions because of her age but
her autonomy should be valued and
explored. The input of her family
should also have impact and guidance
on the course of her treatment. A
comprehensive plan would be in the
best interest of this patient, devised
by all parties involved in her care.
More facts on the medical condition
of the patient’s health status would
be necessary to make a confident
decision. The determination of her
condition as stable or critical would
be a vital piece of information. The
duration of her illness would also
determine how fragile her organ
systems may be. There are numerous
complications associated with
anorexia which would make frequent
observation essential in order to
support the best interest of the patient.
The patient’s rights as a human being
must be at the forefront in any aspect
of care.
My concerns lie with the physician
and nurse manager who appear to
be overstepping their professional
boundaries and scope of practice.
There seems to be an air of
stereotyping and “one-size-fits-all”
approach that is dictating the doctor’s
6 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

order set. Have the current standards
of care been investigated? Have they
been discussed with the patient and
her family? A referral to a trained
colleague specializing in or having
experience in the treatment of anorexia
nervosa would be the initial step a
prudent practitioner would utilize
in this particular patient’s plan and
execution of care.
I believe the player who has shown
the highest ethical standards and
critical thinking is the nurse who
advocated for the rights of her patient.
Her first appropriate action was to
question the therapeutic effectiveness
of the orders she received for isolating
and restraining a manipulative patient.
An act of conscious professionalism
followed and resulted in a decision
to consult the ethics committee. The
culture of nursing is patient-centered,
focusing on the individual needs of
each patient. The nurse fulfilled her
oath by questioning the orders she has
received and seeking further expertise
on the matter at hand.
Our duty is to find the motivation
behind the young woman’s behavior,
not to label, isolate, violate and
restrain her. These extreme measures
are to be weighed carefully with
prudent judgment, taking into
account what is in the best interest
of the young woman. The potential
benefits versus the burdens of our
actions must be fully examined
before an individual’s rights are
compromised. An ethical analysis
utilizing the principles of patient
autonomy, medical beneficence and
justice or fairness is imperative before
complying with the physician’s and
nurse manager’s orders.
Elizabeth Whelan Todd, RN
Case Manager for the Balance
Center and Neuroday Program
at DGH for Shore Health System,
Member of Shore Health System Ethics
Committee

COMMENTS FROM A
PEDIATRIC INTENSIVIST
& PEDIATRIC CRITICAL
CARE NURSE
Good medical ethics first and
foremost requires good medicine,
and good medicine requires adequate
medical knowledge as well as good
communication. Knowledge of
the psychopathology of anorexia
nervosa and the pathophysiology of
starvation are essential to the proper
treatment of this young lady. Nurses
are taught to encourage patients to
express their feelings and to validate
them. However, the therapeutic
relationship as perceived by the nurse
is not necessarily the one which is
appropriate in this situation. The
nurse caring for the patient is
suffering “moral distress” because
the prescribed minimal interaction
is in conflict with her perception of
her duty to establish a therapeutic
relationship. Anorexia nervosa is
best treated in a specialized unit,
usually of a psychiatric facility,
with staff who have experience and
expertise in treating eating disorders.
However, most units of this nature
will not accept patients with acute
life-threatening conditions which
may occur as a result of anorexia,
such as electrolyte abnormalities
or cardiovascular compromise.
Therefore, before definitive treatment
of the eating disorder can begin,
including establishment of therapeutic
relationships, the patient must be
stabilized in an acute care medical
facility. It is very likely that most
medical floors in community hospitals
do not have extensive experience with
teenagers with eating disorders.
It is a characteristic of anorexia
nervosa that patients frequently refuse
to engage with treatment, in spite
of danger to health and life. This
is so characteristic of the disorder

that it is described in the DSM-IV,
immediately following the list of
criteria given above, as follows:
“The individual is often brought
to professional attention by family
members after marked weight loss
(or failure to make expected weight
gains) has occurred. Individuals with
Anorexia Nervosa frequently lack
insight into, or have considerable
denial of, the problem and may be
unreliable historians. It is therefore
often necessary to obtain information
from parents or other outside sources
to evaluate the degree of weight loss
and other features of the illness”
(American Psychiatric Association,
2000). Treatment is sometimes given
compulsorily, although there is much
variation in its use (The Royal College
of Psychiatrists, 1992).
Competence to make treatment
decisions is an important issue to
consider when the patient is at risk
and compulsory treatment is being
contemplated, but there is very little
research to help in the understanding
of this area in anorexia nervosa. The
treatment of anorexia nervosa often
involves implementing a re-feeding
program that may require the use of
strict supervision, enforcement of
prescribed dietary plans, prevention of
exercising or purging, and naso-gastric
or gastrostomy tube feeding. All these
measures restrict freedom and can be
experienced as intrusive and coercive
by the patients, their families, and
the clinical staff. Those involved can,
for these reasons, feel concern about
imposing treatment irrespective of
whether they believe it to be effective
(Beumont & Vandereycken, 1998).
Patients with anorexia nervosa often
refuse to cooperate with treatment,
in spite of danger to health and life.
They often lack insight into, or have
considerable denial of, the problem.
They may be extremely manipulative,
and may try to circumvent the

measures instituted to establish
nutrition. All of this can cause moral
distress in those whose task it is to
implement these measures.
There is also evidence that insight
may be further compromised by the
malnutrition itself, and that until the
patient is in a better nutritional state,
there may be even less understanding
and insight than there would be
otherwise. In order for this nurse not
to feel moral distress, she needs to
understand the nature of the disease
and the treatment. If the degree
of malnutrition is immediately
life threatening (electrolye or
cardiovascular abnormalities), then
the priority of treatment is establishing
effective correction, by any means
possible. The nurses caring for the
patient need to understand the nature
of the illness and their role in caring
for this young lady before psychiatric
care is instituted. In order for that
to happen, the nursing staff should
discuss the priorities and essential
elements of this patient’s care with the
attending physician, psychiatrist, and
others to implement (and understand)
a safe and appropriate plan for this
patient. This will also enable staff to
explore the difficulties and distress
perceived by the nursing staff, and
to reassure the nursing staff that they
are not providing “cruel and unusual”
care.
This, of course, is not to say that
the nurse caring for the patient should
be abrupt or appear uncaring in any
way. The necessary procedures to
restore physical health to the patient
so that she can begin her journey to
mental health should, of course, be
carried out in a sympathetic manner,
and any distressing procedures
should be explained and described
to the patient as they are being
implemented. However, the risk of
the patient subverting the procedures
by entangling the nurse in long

negotiations is a very real one, as
patients with anorexia can be very
good at manipulating their caregivers.
The issue of capacity for decisionmaking is a complex one in this
case. Although the patient is 17
years old, and not of legal age for
medical decision making (assuming
she is not an emancipated minor),
she is certainly old enough that her
assent should be sought for most
treatment decisions. However, in
the face of psychiatric disease which
limits insight and is associated with
denial, she most likely would not have
capacity to make decisions for consent
or assent surrounding the treatment
of the disease (regardless of age).
Psychiatric input for establishment
of capacity would be crucial. Again,
as the nature of the disease involves
denial or lack of insight, there would
be no ethical obligation to obtain
her assent to treatment, and indeed,
good ethics as good medicine would
demand nutrition with or without her
assent. Just as one would not let a
young child dictate their care, and a
good parent would implement those
things necessary to ensure the health
of their child, the establishment of
effective medical therapy in this case
is the first priority. Similarly, we
would not allow a suicidal teenager
to proceed in their quest to end their
life, no matter how distressing the
intervention may appear to the child.
It seems to us that to optimally
resolve this case, a meeting should
take place including the attending
physician, the psychiatric consultant,
nursing leadership and the nurse who
requested the ethics consultation, as
well as any other nurses caring for
the patient who have questions or
concerns regarding her care. The plan
of care, both acutely in the community
hospital, as well as ultimately, in
a psychiatric facility, should be
Cont. on page 8
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Cont. from page 7
explained in detail to the nursing
staff, and they should have adequate
time and opportunity to express their
concerns. The physician staff and
nursing leadership should likewise be
afforded the opportunity to express
their concerns regarding the risk of
the patient subverting her care, and
a mutually agreed-upon plan of care
should be formulated.
Charlotte Glicksman, MD
Pediatric Intensivist
Janie Ginsburg, RN, BSN, CCRN
Pediatric Critical Care Nurse
The Herman and Walter Samuelson
Children’s Hospital at Sinai
Sinai Hospital of Baltimore
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COMMENTS FROM
SHEPPARD-PRATT ETHICS
COMMITTEE
The patient with severe anorexia
nervosa (AN) often poses a complex
and daunting challenge, even in
settings with significant experience
in treating such individuals. The
illness is often conceptualized in
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a biopsychosocial frame with a
multifactorial etiology. The core
symptom of AN is a significant selfimposed starvation coupled with a
profound, morbid fear of fatness in
the context of an individual who does
not or cannot acknowledge this as a
problem. Complicating matters are
a range of psychiatric and medical
comorbidities which propel the death
rate to 5% per decade from the point
of diagnosis, the highest of any mental
illness. Since the earliest references
to the illness in the mid 1600’s, and
the more modern characterizations
by Gull and Lasegue in the 19th
century, eating disorders have been
the subject of extensive research
in psychiatry, clinical psychology,
somatic medicine, and more recently,
ethics. The question at the heart of the
ethical consideration is to what extent
a person should be allowed to make
an autonomous decision to starve,
and what constitutes an ethicallysound approach to the seriously
compromised patient with AN. So
began the discussion of our ethics
committee stimulated by the case
presentation above. We grappled with
the case and its nuances, leading us
to reaffirm some basic principles, and
then ask some broader questions.
Pertinent Basic Principles in the
Treatment of AN
1. Treatment of the severely ill
patient with AN (absent extreme
physical compromise and/or
need for cardiac monitoring) best
occurs in specialty eating disorder
settings with a clinical staff with
significant experience in eating
disorders. Often, highly resistant
patients will autonomously eat and
refeed in such settings without the
need for involuntary (physically
forced) feeding.
2. Involuntary feeding of patients
with AN should only be used

as an absolute last resort in
patients with physical and
cognitive deterioration and
compromise, and only after
significant attempts have been
made to repeatedly encourage
autonomous feeding. Involuntary
feeding itself, via nasogastric tube
or hyperalimentation through
central or venous access, carries
significant potential for morbidity
and mortality. These risks must
be carefully balanced with the
risks of chronic emaciation and
nutritional deprivation for the
individual patient.
3. Repeated attempts should be
made to engage the physically
compromised, resistant patient
through development of a
therapeutic alliance. This often
requires great patience, empathy,
and a willingness to tolerate
repeated rejections by the patient
of the efforts of caregivers to
provide help. While power
struggles should be avoided, only
“minimal interaction” with the
patient is unlikely to facilitate
alliance and is not advised. In
forced treatment situations, the
patient should receive ongoing
explanation of the rationale for the
prescribed treatment.
4. Education of all providers is
essential. In the case presented,
the nurse has made a sound
judgment to engage the ethics
committee in discussion of the
case. Efforts should be pursued
to educate the nurse about the
need for and the reasons for the
proposed treatment, as well as
the risks to the patient of not
providing the treatment. In a
culture that overemphasizes the
importance of thinness, some
caregivers tend to minimize the
extent of the patient’s illness and

thus struggle with exerting control
through paternalistic measures.
Splits and disagreements within
the treatment team will generally
lead to a poor outcome. Input
from a consultation-liaison
psychiatrist might be indicated in
such a situation.
Autonomy versus Paternalism
In discussion of this case, our ethics
group grappled with the complex
interface between the autonomous
right to choose one’s course in life,
and the paternalistic treatment of
individuals with cognitive impairment,
distorted thinking, and physical
deterioration. What constitutes
autonomy? Is a patient’s decision to
starve a truly autonomous decision? Is
the patient acting under the influence
of a brain disorder which distorts
thinking in the area of body shape,
weight, and appearance? To what
extent do patients have a right to
pursue the symptoms of AN if that is
what they “want”? What behaviors
are dangerous enough to warrant
paternalism and involuntary treatment?
Is the pursuit of compulsive exercise,
or other compensatory behaviors
such as vomiting, enough and to what
degree must such behaviors exist?
In our final analysis, we agreed
that there are not bright-line,
definitive answers to such questions.
Clearly, the nuances of each clinical
presentation of treatment refusal in
AN will require thoughtful and careful
analysis of these issues going forward.
Harry Brandt, MD
Director
Steven Crawford, MD
Associate Director
The Center for Eating Disorders
at Sheppard Pratt
Members of
Sheppard-Pratt Ethics Committee

COMMENTS FROM
AN ATTORNEY WHO
REPRESENTS CHILDREN
WITH DISABILITIES
The two key legal questions presented
in this case study are:
1. Is the 17 year old patient capable
of providing informed consent
and thus, informed refusal to the
tube feedings and to the hand
restraints?
2. Does the use of restraints in
this situation comport with the
requirements of the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) and the Joint Commission?
In answer to the first question, the
general rule is that individuals under
the age of 18 do not have the capacity
to consent to medical treatment.
Their parents or legal guardians
provide informed consent or informed
refusal on their behalf. Thus, unless
it is an emergency or other specific
situation covered by Maryland’s
minors’ consent to treatment statutes,
the patient’s parents must provide
or withhold consent to the forced
feedings (Health General Article 20101 et seq). In order to meet informed
consent legal requirements, the parents
must be told the child’s diagnoses, the
proposed treatment, the alternatives to
those treatments including the option
of no treatment and the material risks
of the proposed treatments and the
alternatives. Even if the minor patient
does not have the capacity to consent,
it is good practice to also provide her
with all of the information provided
to her parents and to answer all of
her questions about her treatment.
Another important consideration for
the clinicians to review is the extent
to which the patient’s psychiatric
impairment and/or medication regimen
impairs her cognition and thus, her
decision making capacity.

From an ethical perspective, the
clinicians should work to preserve
the patient’s autonomy to the greatest
extent possible even if the patient does
not have the legal capacity to consent.
The patient is much more likely to
be an active and willing participant
in her treatment if she knows what
is happening to her and why from a
medical and psychiatric perspective.
The direction from the physician
and nursing supervisor to “interact
minimally” with the patient, makes
no legal or ethical sense. From a legal
perspective, it could mean that vital
information related to patient care
will be missed and that the patient
may be harmed as a result of this
lack of information. From an ethical
perspective, it greatly diminishes the
patient’s autonomy by diminishing her
participation and voice in her care.
With respect to the second question,
both CMS and the Joint Commission
have requirements for the use of
restraints in hospitals. Standard
PC.03.05.09 in the Comprehensive
Accreditation Manual for Hospitals
includes the definition of restraint
and seclusion and also what is not
a restraint. The Joint Commission
follows the CMS definition of
restraint, which is, in relevant part
“[a]ny manual method, physical
or mechanical device, material, or
equipment that immobilizes or reduces
the ability of a patient to move his or
her arms, legs, body, or head freely”
42 CFR 482.13(e)(1)(i). The Case
Study’s description clearly includes
the authorization of the use of “hand
restraints.” It is unclear from the case
study whether the physician’s ordering
of restraints under these circumstances
meets the requirements established by
either CMS or the Commission which
are specific as to who can authorize
restraint, the circumstances under
which restraints can be authorized, the
Cont. on page 10
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Case Presentation
Cont. from page 9
length of time during which restraints
may be used, and how often the
patient must be reevaluated for the
use of restraints. All staff members
who authorize or use restraints must
have specialized training in the use

of restraints. The Joint Commission’s
Acute Medical and Surgical
(Nonpsychiatric) Care restraint
standards are found in Standards
PC.03.05.01 through PC.03.05.19
(effective July 1, 2009).

Ellen A. Callegary, Esq.
Callegary & Steedman, P.A.
Baltimore, MD

CALENDAR OF EVENTS
APRIL
11

(12-1:30 p.m.) Speaker: Jerry Menikoff, MD, JD, Director of the Office for Human Research Protections, (topic TBA). Sponsored by the Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series. Armstrong Building, West Lecture Hall, Hopkins medical campus (near E. Monument St. & N. Bond St.). For more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org, or contact Michelle Martin-Daniels at mmartind@
jhsph.edu.

21

Practical Clinical Ethics: The ABC’s of Palliative Care. Sponsored by Harbor Hospital. Harbor Hospital, 3001 S. Hanover St. For more information, contact Marissa Popkin at 410-350-3552.

25

(12-1:30 p.m.) Speaker: Jim Lavery, MSc, PhD, research scientist in the Centre for Research on Inner
City Health and Centre for Global Health Research, University of Toronto (topic TBA). Sponsored
by the Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series. Armstrong Building, West Lecture Hall. For
more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org, or contact Michelle Martin-Daniels at
mmartind@ jhsph.edu.

26

(12-1:00 p.m.) Informal discussion with Tom Tomlinson, PhD, Co-Director of Bioethics, Humanities
& Society and Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University. Penn Center for Bioethics, 3401
Market Street, Room 321, Philadelphia, PA. RSVP to spaebh@mail.med.upenn.edu. Call 215-8987136 for more information.

26

“Pain is a Four-Letter Word,” 5th Annual Bioethics Symposium. Sponsored by the Center for Practical
Bioethics. Kansas City, MO. For more information, contact Cindy Leland at cleyland@practicalbioethics.org.

29

Clinical Ethics Consultation – The State of the Art. Sponsored by the Bioethics Network of Ohio.
Dublin, Ohio (near Columbus). For more information, visit http://www.beno-ethics.org.

MAY
9

(12-1:30 p.m.) Speaker: Susan Reverby, PhD, Marion Butler McLean Professor in the History of
Ideas; Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies, Wellesley College (topic TBA). Sponsored by the
Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series. Wolfe W3008, Hopkins medical campus. For more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org, or contact Michelle Martin-Daniels at mmartind@
jhsph.edu.
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS (cont'd)
JUNE
2-4

Canadian Bioethics Society 22nd Annual Conference, Saint John, New Brunswick, Canada. For
more information, visit http://www.cbssaintjohn2011.org/.

6-10

Intensive Bioethics Course, Sponsored by the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C. For more information, visit http://www.kennedyinstitute.georgetown.edu.

15-17 “Harvard Clinical Bioethics Course.” Sponsored by the Division of Medical Ethics, Harvard Medical School. Boston, MA. For more information,contact Helena Martins at Helena_martins@hms.
harvard.edu.
20-24 Teaching Ethics Workshop, sponsored by the Center for Healthcare Ethics at Duquesne University,
Pittsburgh, PA. For more information, visit http://www.duq.edu/chce, or e-mail tenhaveh@duq.edu.
29

Primer for Health Care Ethics Committee Members, sponsored by Harbor Hospital’s Ethics Committee in Partnership with the Maryland Health Care Ethics Committee Network and the Center for Ethics at Washington Hospital Center. Harbor Hospital, 3001 S. Hanover St., Baltimore, MD. For more
information, visit http://www.law.umaryland.edu/mhecn, or contact Mary Barnes at mbarnes@law.
umaryland.edu.

JULY
22-23 Seventh Annual Pediatric Bioethics Conference, Sponsored by Seattle Children's Hospital, Bell Harbor International Conference Center, Seattle, WA. For more information, visit http://www.seattlechildrens.org/research/initiatives/bioethics/events/pediatric-bioethics-conference/.
22-24 Penn Conference on Clinical Neuroscience & Society. Sponsored by the Penn Center for Neuroscience & Society. 3810 Walnut St., Philadelphia, PA. For more information, visit http://neuroethics.
upenn.edu/index.php/events/clinical-conference, or e-mail conference@neuroethics.upenn.edu.
AUGUST
4-7

Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress. Sponsored by the Center for Values and Social Policy,
University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO. For more information, visit http://www.colorado.
edu/philosophy/center/rome.
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